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Abstract
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monetary policy in a general equilibriummodel with heterogeneous agents,
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ū
ū Introduction
This paper studies alternative decision-making models for the determination of
monetary policy. We consider a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous
consumers. Diﬀerences in preferences yield diverse inﬂation aversions. Mon-
etary policy is decided within a policy board that represents the agents’ pref-
erences. This allows us to compare the outcome of the following central bank
designs: ﬁrst, we analyze simple-majority voting and supermajority voting, i.e.
majority voting with veto power for the minority. Then, we analyze a policy
board,where the representatives of each group of agents bargain over themoney
growth rate with and without allowing for lump-sum transfers.ū
Our framework builds on the representative agentmodel of Lagos andWright
(ŬŪŪů). Their model is useful because it allows us to introduce heterogeneous
preferences for consumption while still keeping the distribution of money bal-
ances tracktable. Agents have either high or a low utility from consumption.
The main consequence is that there is a two-point distribution of money hold-
ings and, therefore, monetary policy has redistributive eﬀects as the inﬂation tax
aﬀects agents diﬀerently.Ŭ
The following results emerge from the model. First, the social planner’s de-
sired inﬂation rate is the Friedman Rule, i.e. an inﬂation rate at the rate of time
preferences. This eﬃcient outcome is aĴained if, under simple-majority voting,
the agents with low-inﬂation preferences have the majority. Under bargaining,
ﬁrst-best can only be aĴainedwhen transfers are feasible. Second, under all other
central bank designs the equilibrium outcome does not aĴain the ﬁrst-best allo-
cation. In particular, under some simple-majority voting, when the agents with
high inﬂation preferences have amajority, the resulting inﬂation is strictly above
the FriedmanRule. The same is true for bargaining and for supermajority voting.
An interesting aspect of our ﬁndings is that when we study two separate
economies, one populated by agents with low preferences for consumptions and
ūSee Persson and Tabellini (ŬŪŪŪ) and Gerling, Grüner, Kiel, and Schulte (ŬŪŪŭ) for expositions
and surveys of diﬀerent decision-making mechanisms.
ŬRedistributive eﬀects of monetary policy in a diﬀerent context have been studied in Berentsen,
Camera, andWaller (ŬŪŪů), BhaĴacharya, Haslag, andMartin (ŬŪŪů), BhaĴacharya, Haslag, and Rus-
sell (ŬŪŪů), Boel and Camera (ŬŪŪŰ), Molico (ŬŪŪŰ), or Haslag and Martin (ŬŪŪű).
Ŭ
the other populated with agents with high preferences for consumptions, each
prefers the Friedman Rule. In particular for any central bank design the outcome
will be the Friedman Rule in each economy. If these two economies form a mon-
etary union, then a deviation of the Friedman Rule can be the outcome. This is
due to the redistributional eﬀect of inﬂation in an economy with heterogeneous
agents.ŭ
Bullard and Waller (ŬŪŪŮ) have the most closely related analysis. They dis-
cuss the advantages of various alternative decision-making models in an over-
lapping-generations model. First, they ﬁnd that if the inﬂation-averse agents
have a minority, the resulting inﬂation is inﬁnite. In contrast, under the same in-
stitutional rule, the equilibrium inﬂation rate in ourmodel is above the Friedman
Rule, but it is ﬁnite. This major diﬀerence is due to their use of the overlapping-
generationsmodelwhere the young generation prefers a hyperinﬂation. Second,
in their model, a constitutional rule (i.e. supermajority voting) implements the
ﬁrst-best allocation. In our model however, supermajority voting never yields
the ﬁrst-best allocation. As they remark (p. ūūŬ), “the problems with majority
voting and bargaining are remedied by giving the older, minority generation a
veto over proposed policy changes [using supermajority voting]. This acts as a
formof commitment, causing the young to choosemonetary policy based on life-
time utility, and thus to create a stationary equilibrium at the social optimum.”
We propose a diﬀerent solution to aĴain the ﬁrst-best allocation: bargaining
with transfers. Appropriate transfers allow the economy to move to the Fried-
man Rule from any status quo inﬂation rate since the agents who lose from the
change of monetary policy are compensated. If the transfers are lump-sum, they
yield a Pareto superior allocation. One interpretation of our result is that mone-
tary policy needs to be linked to ﬁscal policy since this allows for such transfers.
We organize the paper as follows. In section Ŭ, we present the environment.
Section ŭ analyzes monetary equilibria and the optimality of the Friedman Rule.
Section Ů then examines alternative institutional arrangements for the determi-
nation of monetary policy and discusses the results. Extending our model in
section ů allows us to interpret our results similar to those of Erosa and Ventura
ŭThis result, although derived in a very diﬀerent context, is in accordancewith Hagen and Süppel
(ūųųŮ).
ŭ
(ŬŪŪŬ). Finally, we provide a brief conclusion.
Ŭ The Model
Time is discrete. There is a [Ū,ū] continuum of inﬁnite-lived agents. In each pe-
riod, two Walrasian markets open and close sequentially.Ů Only one market is
open at any one time. We assume there are two perishable goods produced and
consumed by all agents. Agents get utility U(x) from consuming x  0 of a gen-
eralized good with U(0) = 0, U 0(x) > 0, U 0(0) =1, U 0(+1) = 0, and U 00(x) < 0
in the ﬁrst market. In the secondmarket, an agent gets utility " u(q) from consuming
the specialized good q  0 where u(0) = 0, u0(q) > 0, u0(0) = 1, u0(+1) = 0,
u00(q) < 0, and u000(q) > 0.ů In the ﬁrst market, agents provide working hours h
at the linear cost function c(h) = h. The cost of producing a good in the second
market is linear, i.e. c(q) = q.
There are three types of agents: sellers, labeled s, and two types of buyers,
labeled l and h, as explained below. Sellers produce in the second market and
consume in the ﬁrst market. Buyers, however, consume in the second market
and produce and consume in the ﬁrst. The timing is as follows: at the beginning
of each period, the ﬁrst market opens. Then, aĞer seĴling all trades, the second
market opens. Figure ū provides a simple illustration of our model’s timing.
m1 m2 m1,+1
First Market
sellers consume
buyers consume/produce
Second Market
sellers produce
buyers consume
1
Figure ū: The Model
The two buyer types diﬀer in their marginal utility as follows. The low type,
l, receives utility "l u(q) and the high type, h, utility "h u(q)when they consume q
ŮBy assuming competitive pricing in all markets, we depart from Lagos and Wright (ŬŪŪů) as for
example in Rocheteau and Wright (ŬŪŪů).
ůThe ѐџџю utility functions, for example, satisfy these requirements.
Ů
in the secondmarket, where 0 < "l < "h. In the ﬁrstmarket, all agents, regardless
of their state, can provide labor h as well as consume the homogeneous good x.
The measures of buyers and of sellers are each normalized to 1. The measure of
low-type buyers is nl and themeasure of high-type buyers is nhwith nl+nh = 1.
The common discount factor is .
While consumption and production goods are non-storable, there is a stor-
able object called money. Money is perfectly divisible and agents can hold any
quantity up to the total nominal stock, i.e. 0  m  M . Money (e.g. a simple
piece of paper) has no intrinsic value, i.e. so called “ﬁat money.” Since agents are
anonymous and there is no double coincidence of wants, agents need money to
trade.Ű
We assume that there is a monetary authority called central bank that prints
ﬁat money at zero cost. The supply of money M changes according to Mt =
Mt 1.We assume that the central bank, in the ﬁrstmarket, injectsmoney through
lump-sum transfers  = (  1)Mt 1. If  < 1, this means that the central bank
has the ability to tax agents.
Ŭ.ū Consumption and Production
Let p1 be the price of goods in the ﬁrst market. We study equilibria where begin-
ning-of-period real money balances are time-invariant:
Mt
p1,t
=
Mt 1
p1,t 1
(ū)
We refer to it as a stationary equilibrium. This lets us omit the time subscript,
when understood, and study a representative period, working backwards from
the second to the ﬁrst market – within that period.
Ŭ.ū.ū The Last Market
Let Vj(m) denote the value from trading in the second market of period t with
m real units of money and type j 2 fh, l, sg. Deﬁne Wj(m) accordingly for the
ﬁrst market. Let q and qs be the quantities bought by a buyer, respectively sold
by a seller, trading in the second market. An agent withm real money balances
ŰSee also Wallace (ŬŪŪŬ) for a discussion about anonymity.
ů
and type j 2 fh, l, sg at the opening of the second market solves the following
program
Vi(m) = max
0qm
"i u(q) + Wi

(m  q) p2
p1,+1

8 i 2 fh, lg (Ŭa)
Vs(m) = max
qs0
 qs + Ws

(m+ qs)
p2
p1,+1

(Ŭb)
for being buyer or seller, respectively.
Sellers. As a seller, an agent chooses qs to maximize Vs. The ﬁrst-order condi-
tion is

p2
p1,+1
W 0s

(m+ qs)
p2
p1,+1

 1 (= if qs > 0) (ŭ)
We can interpret the leĞ-hand side of (ŭ) as the marginal revenue of a trade
in the secondmarket and the right-hand side as themarginal cost of producing a
good. A seller can acquire money in the ﬁrst or in the second market and will do
so at the lowest cost. Since sellers have the same linear production cost in both
markets, they are only indiﬀerent if the prices in bothmarkets are equal, adjusted
for discounting. In this case, they are willing to supply all that is demanded, so
the supply curve in the second market is ﬂat.
Buyers. As a buyer, an agent chooses q tomaximizeVi given her cash constraint
q  m (Ů)
and her state i 2 fh, lg
LeĴing i  0 be the Lagrangian on the cash constraint for all i 2 fh, lg yields
the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
"i u0(q)   p2
p1,+1
W 0i

(m  q) p2
p1,+1

  i  0 (= 0 if q > 0) (ůa)
i (m  q) = 0 (ůb)
Ŭ.ū.Ŭ The First Market
Let x and h be the quantities bought, respectively sold, by an agent trading in the
ﬁrstmarket. There, agents choose howmanyworking units to oﬀer, h, howmuch
to buy, x, and how much real money to take into the next period,m0. Hence, an
Ű
agent of type j and real money holdings m at the beginning of the ﬁrst market
solves the following program:
Wj(m) = max
x,h,m0
U(x)  h+ Vj

p1
p2
m0

s.t. x+m0 = h+m+ 
p1
(Ű)
where  is the nominal lump-sum transfer from the central bank. Note that sell-
ers receive no transfers, i.e.  = 0 in (Ű) for sellers. Agents only discount future
periods, but not sub-periods.
AĞer substituting for h, we get the following ﬁrst-order condition for con-
sumption for all types of agents j 2 fh, l, sg:
U 0(x) = 1 (ű)
According to (ű), the marginal utility of buying equals the marginal cost of
producing a good. Thus, trades are always eﬃcient in the ﬁrst market.
The ﬁrst-order condition for the choice of real money holdingsm0 satisﬁes
p1
p2
V 0j

p1
p2
m0

 1 (= 1 ifm0 > 0) (Ų)
Equation (Ų) implies that the amount of money buyers take into the second
market depends on their preference parameter " which is either high or low.
Consequently, the distribution of intermarket money holdings of buyers has two
mass points in contrast to the standard model of Lagos and Wright (ŬŪŪů). As
shown below, p1/p2 = / and for sellers V 0s () = 1. Therefore,m0 = 0 for them
if  > . Intuitively, sellers have no beneﬁt from using money in the second
market. Hence, they consume all of their previous earnings and enter the second
market without money holdings.
Envelope conditions. The envelope condition for the ﬁrst market is
W 0j(m) = 1 8 j 2 fh, l, sg (ų)
Using (ŭ) and (ų) we can thus state that
p1,+1
p2
=  (ūŪ)
ű
Then, let us diﬀerentiate (Ŭ) with respect to m to get the envelope condition
for the second market
V 0i (m) = 
p2
p1,+1
W 0i

(m  q) p2
p1,+1

+  8 i 2 fh, lg (ūūa)
V 0s (m) = 
p2
p1,+1
W 0s

(m+ q)
p2
p1,+1

(ūūb)
From (ů), (Ų), and (ūūa) it further follows that
" u0(q) =
p2
p1
Using (ū) and (ūŪ) yields
  

= "i u0(qi)  1 8 i 2 fh, lg (ūŬ)
which is the standard equilibrium condition in Lagos and Wright (ŬŪŪů).
Finally, let q be the solution to " u0(q) = 1 and let m = q. Then, we can
state the following:
Lemma ū. In equilibrium, if
(i) m  m, then  = 0, q = q, and Vi(m) is linear
(ii) m < m, then  > 0, q < q, and Vi(m) is concave
for all buyer types i 2 fh, lg
Lemma ū shows that trades in the second market are eﬃcient if and only if
a buyer of type i holds at leastmi units of money. A proof of this lemma can be
found in appendix A.ū.
ŭ Equilibria
The key element of our model is that diﬀerent preference parameters generate
a distribution of money holdings in both markets, i.e. every buyer with a high
preference parameter "h enters the following periodwithmh1 units of real money
and those with a low one, "l, withml1 units.
To determine the equilibria in our model, we ﬁrst state the following:
Deﬁnition ū. A stationary monetary equilibrium is a
Ų
• time-invariant list

x,h, qh, ql, qs,mh1 ,ml1
	
and a
• sequence of prices and money holdings fp1, p2,h,lg
that satisfy (ū)–(Ų).
We can now state our main proposition regarding the existence and unique-
ness of monetary equilibria.
Proposition ū. A stationary monetary equilibrium exists if and only if   . For
 = , we have ql = ql < qh = qh and for  > , ql < ql , qh < qh and ql < qh. If
 > , the monetary equilibrium is unique.
The proof of proposition ū can be found in appendix A.Ŭ. It implies that the
money growth rate  cannot be smaller than . With a lowermoney growth rate,
each agent would aĴempt to accumulate as much money as possible. Analyzing
the money holdings, we can state that mh2  ml2 in any monetary equilibrium.
The reason why high-type agents hold more money than low-type agents is that
the opportunity cost of holding money is higher for low-type agents since they
get less consumption utility.
Note that proposition ū states that money is neutral, but not superneutral. In-
creasing its stock has no eﬀect on the quantities consumed, while changing the
money growth rate  does. Moreover,  =  generates the ﬁrst-best allocation
in our economy.
ŭ.ū Inﬂation Tax
In the following, we discuss how the inﬂation tax aﬀects consumption andmon-
ey holdings. Further, we study how welfare and expected lifetime utilities are
aﬀected by marginal changes in the money growth rate.
From (ūŬ), it is straightforward that inﬂation reduces ﬁrst-period consump-
tion and real money holdings of both types of agents, respectively:
@ qi
@ 
=
1
 "i u00(qi)
< 0 8 i 2 fh, lg (ūŭ)
Figure Ŭ shows that money holdings are decreasing with inﬂation.ű
űFor our numerical illustrations, we use a standard ѐџџю utility function.
ų
q
h
, q
l
µ
1β
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1
Figure Ŭ: Eﬀect of the inﬂation tax on buying and selling quantities
From (ū) and (Ű), let us now derive the buyers’ expected lifetime utilities in
the ﬁrst market in equilibrium:
Wi(m) = U(x

i ) 

xi +m
0  m  
p1

+ Vi
 
m0

Inserting (Ŭ) yields
Wi(0) = ªi  m0 + 
p1
+ " u(q) + Wi(0)
where ªi  U(xi )  xi is a constant and where m = 0 since buyers, in equilib-
rium, enter the ﬁrstmarketwithout cash (see proposition ū). Solving for the value
functions using the fact that /p1 = (  1)
 
nh qh + n
l ql

noting that m0 =  q
we get
Wh(0) =
ª+ "h u(qh)  qh + (  1) (ql   qh)nl
1   (ūŮa)
Wl(0) =
ª+ "l u(ql)  ql + (  1) (qh   ql)nh
1   (ūŮb)
The term (  1) (ql   qh)nl represents the inﬂation tax for the high-type agents.
If  > 1, inﬂation redistributes real purchasing power from high- to low-type
buyers. In contrast, if  < 1, inﬂation leads to a real transfer from low to high
types.
A numerical illustration of (ūŮ) is depicted in ﬁgure ŭ.
ūŪ
W
h
,W
l
µ
1β µ˜
W
h
W
l
1
Figure ŭ: Equilibrium expected utilities of high- and low-type agents
Using this, we can examine how the expected lifetime utilities change with
the growth rate of the money supply .
@Wh(0)
@ 
=

"h u0(qh)  1
 @ qh
@  + n
l
(ql   qh) + (  1)nl

@ ql
@    @ qh@ 

1   (ūůa)
@ Wl(0)
@ 
=

"l u0(ql)  1
 @ ql
@  + n
h
(qh   ql) + (  1)nh

@ qh
@    @ ql@ 

1   (ūůb)
Note that @ qi/@  is given by (ūŭ). The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (ūů)
is always negative because the marginal utilities are greater or equal to ū and
@ q
@  < 0. This term represents the loss of utility since consumption decreases as
the inﬂation rate increases. This is a standard eﬀect in many models of money.
The second and the third termare derived from (  1) (ql   qh)nl of (ūŮ). The
second term is the direct eﬀect of the inﬂation tax. For high-type agents this eﬀect
is always negative since in equilibrium ql < qh, whereas it is always positive
for low-type agents. It describes the change of the transfer of real money from
high- to low-type agents. If  > 1, high types transfer money to low types. An
increase in inﬂation then means that the transfer also increases. For  < 1, high
types receive transfers from the low types. An increase in themoney growth rate
reduces that transfer.
Let us now have a look at the third term on the right-hand side of (ūů). Using
(ūŭ), we see that the last term of (ūůa) will be negative if the money growth rate
ūū
is smaller than one and positive for a higher money growth rate. For (ūůb) this is
just the opposite as it is positive in a deﬂationary, but negative in an inﬂationary,
environment. This term reﬂects the indirect eﬀect of a change in . A change
in  aﬀects the quantities, and through this, the amount of money each agent
carries. This can be seen from ﬁgure Ŭ where the diﬀerence between qh and ql
is decreasing in . For  > 1, the high-type buyer transfers money to the low-
type buyer and thus beneﬁts from an increase in the money growth rate since
the diﬀerence between qh and ql and the transfer are decreasing. For  < 1, the
high type receives a transfer. In this case, since the diﬀerence between qh and ql
and the transfer are decreasing, he loses.
ŭ.Ŭ Monetary Policy
Friedman (ūųŰų) analyzed the eﬀects of inﬂation in a hypothetical simple society.
He found that the optimal policy is to set the nominal interest rate at zero. In the
standard representative agentmodel, from the Fisher equation, 1+ i = R (1 + ),
where R is the real return on a one-period bond and  is the inﬂation rate, the
Friedman Rule implies that the gross growth rate of the money supply is equal
to the discount factor of the representative agent. Here, the same logic applies.
The real returns in the second market are R = 1 . We will refer to a policy where
! 1R as the Friedman Rule.
Because the quantities bought are maximal at  = , the social planner will
always implement the Friedman Rule. In our model with heterogeneous agents,
the Friedman Rule is not the only Pareto eﬃcient policy. Let us now state the
following proposition.
Proposition Ŭ. For agents with a high marginal utility, the Friedman Rule is the op-
timal monetary policy. For low-type agents, the optimal money growth rate is strictly
greater than the Friedman Rule, but smaller than inﬁnity.
For a formal proof we refer to appendix A.ŭ. In ﬁgure ŭ, the statement of
proposition Ŭ is shown clearly. We see that the optimal money growth rate for
the low-type agents is above the Friedman Rule. This result raises the interesting
political economy question of which monetary policy is chosen in equilibrium.
We will discuss that in the following section.
ūŬ
Ů Institutional Arrangements
We now study various central bank designs. As in Bullard and Waller (ŬŪŪŮ),
we deﬁne a central bank design as “a social arrangement for deciding upon a
monetary policy”.Ų The monetary policy is simply a choice for  2 [,1).
We assume that at the beginning of each period – before entering the ﬁrst
market – a policy board meeting takes place. There, a representative of the high-
type buyers and one of the low-type buyersmeet tomake a decision onmonetary
policy, the value of . In the following, we let themmake their decision depend-
ing on various alternative institutional arrangements, i.e. majority voting, super-
majority voting, and bargaining. Once the decision on the money growth rate is
made, agents start operating in the ﬁrst market where they get the new transfer
from the central bank,  . Note that we only analyze how buyers decide over the
money growth rate. Sellers are not aﬀected by any such decision since they do
not consume in the second market and receive no transfers of money in the ﬁrst
market. Figure Ů depicts the timing of the decision making.
m1 m2 m1,+1
first
market
second
market
policy board meeting
1
Figure Ů: Timing of decisions
The outcomeof the policy boarddepends sometimes on the status quo inﬂation
which is the inﬂation rate that prevailed during the past period. We denote this
status quo inﬂation as ¹. Second, in order to point out the inﬂuence that the
inﬂation rate has on the value functions of buyers, we will from now on rewrite
ŲWe do not analyze how society can commit to certain social arrangements. This issue is beyond
the scope of our analysis.
ūŭ
them as
Wi() 8 i 2 fh, lg
In the following,we analyze simple-majority voting, supermajority voting, as
well as bargaining with and without transfers. Finally, we compare our results.
Ů.ū Simple-Majority Voting
Let us now analyze the outcomes of the most simple institutional arrangement.
We assume that the two policy board member’s voting weights are according to
the population size they represent. Then, the central bankwill adjust the transfer
 in the ﬁrst market to the new level.
Let ~ = argmax Wl(). Using proposition Ŭ, we can then state the follow-
ing:
Corollary ū. Under simple-majority voting, the unique stationary equilibrium outcome
is associated with a money growth rateų
•  = , for nh > nl.
•  = ~, for nl > nh.
The results of corollary ū are intuitive if not to say obvious.Nevertheless, they
are in stark contrast to the overlapping generations model of Bullard andWaller
(ŬŪŪŮ) which yields hyperinﬂation as the outcome of simple-majority voting if
the young generation has a majority. We never obtain hyperinﬂation since it is
never optimal for any buyer type.
Ů.Ŭ Supermajority Voting
In the supermajority (or qualiﬁed majority) voting case, the minority has a veto
power. This means that the majority needs to oﬀer a money growth rate that
makes the minority not worse oﬀ than at the status quo money growth rate ¹.
This is similar to a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer problem. The diﬀerence is that the
majority may want an inﬂation rate that is also beĴer for the other type. We
ųWe do not analyze the case where nl = nh.
ūŮ
will, however, see that in our model supermajority voting reduces to a take-it-
or-leave-it oﬀer problem. We assume that the majority proposes the following
new money growth rate to the minority:
 = argmax

Wi()
s.t. W i() W i(¹)
(ūŰ)
where i represents the majority type and  i the minority.
Let ^ be the solution to Wl() = Wl(¹) with ^  ¹. The outcome to super-
majority voting is then presented in the following:
Corollary Ŭ. Under supermajority voting, if ¹ > ~ then  = ^ , for nh > nl, and if
 = ~, for nl > nh. If ¹  ~, then  = ¹.
For a proof, see the proof of corollary ŭ in appendixA.Ů. If ¹  ~, both types of
agents have divergingwants and so the outcome is the status quomoney growth
rate.
If ¹ > ~, we need to know who has the majority. Consider the high-type
agents. They want the Friedman Rule. The best they can do, however, is to make
the low-type agents indiﬀerent by reducing the inﬂation rate to  = ^. Now,
consider the case where the low-type agents have themajority. Theywant  = ~.
In contrast to the high types they can aĴain this since the reduction from ¹ to ~
beneﬁts both types. Figure ů shows the supermajority outcomes for both high-
and low-type majorities in our numerical examples, respectively.
Ů.ŭ Bargaining
Now, let us consider the case where the two representatives bargain over the
money growth rate . In order to do this, we analyze the asymmetric Nash bar-
gaining solution.
Ů.ŭ.ū Bargaining without Transfers
In this case, buyers bargain over without being able to compensate each other
using lump sum transfers. Thus, we have
 = argmax

[Wh() Wh(¹)] [Wl() Wl(¹)]1 
s.t.   
(ūű)
ūů
µµ¯
1 µ˜
µ˜
β
High-type majority
Low-type majority
1
Figure ů: Supermajority outcome for a majority of high- and low-type buyers
where the threat-points are the value of each agent at the status quo money
growth rate ¹. The ﬁrst-order conditions are

@ Wh()
@ 
[Wl() Wl(¹)] + (1  ) @ Wl()
@ 
[Wh() Wh(¹)] +  = 0 (ūŲa)
 (  ) = 0 (ūŲb)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier.
For any status quomoney growth rate ¹  , we can derive the resulting bar-
gaining solution. Figure Ű displays all possible solutions for the same parameters
that we used for ﬁgure ŭ.
This leads to the following:
Corollary ŭ. If  = 1, the outcome of the Nash bargaining solution without transfers
coincides with the supermajority voting outcome if nh > nl. If  = 0, the outcome
coincides with the supermajority voting outcome if nl > nh. For  2 (0, 1), the resulting
inﬂation rate lies in between the two previous cases.
For a proof, we refer to appendixA.Ů. The inﬂation ratewith bargainingwith-
out transfers lies in between the cases of supermajority voting. The intuition is
that supermajority voting are basically take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers.
Note that the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution always yields to a Pareto
optimal solution. Because of this, if the status quo inﬂation rate is not Pareto
ūŰ
µµ¯
1 µ˜
µ˜
θ = 1
θ = 0
β
Bargaining without Transfers
1
Figure Ű: Nash bargaining solution (y-axis) as a function of the status quomoney
growth rate (x-axis).
eﬃcient, there will be a one-time jump to a Pareto eﬃcient inﬂation rate aĞer
which no further changes occur.
Ů.ŭ.Ŭ Bargaining with Transfers
Let us now analyze the bargaining problem when the two parties have the abil-
ity to compensate each other with transfers. Transfers have to be regarded as a
kind of subsidy from the one type of agent to the other.With transfers, the policy
board bargains over themoney growth rate  and a transfer z taking into account
that   . This case is interesting for two reasons. First, it yields a benchmark to
which we can compare our other outcomes. Second, the policy board can agree
on outcomes which, in the absence of transfers, would not satisfy the participa-
tion constraint of one of the two groups.
The bargaining power of the high-type agent is again , so we have the fol-
lowing bargaining solution:
 = argmax
,z
[Wh()  z  Wh(¹)] [Wl() + z  Wl(¹)]1 
s.t.   
(ūų)
ūű
The ﬁrst-order conditions then are

@ Wh()
@ 
[Wl()  z  Wl(¹)]
+ (1  ) @ Wl()
@ 
[Wh() + z  Wh(¹)] +  = 0 (ŬŪa)
   [Wl()  z  Wl(¹)] + (1  ) [Wh() + z  Wh(¹)] = 0 (ŬŪb)
 (   ) = 0 (ŬŪc)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier.
Rearranging, we get for the ﬁrst one the following condition
@Wh()
@ 
+
@Wl()
@ 
+ ^ = 0 (Ŭū)
where ^ = / f(1  ) [Wh() + z  Wh(¹)]g. This leads to the following
Corollary Ů. Nash bargaining over the money growth rate with lump-sum transfers
leads to the Friedman Rule.
The proof is in appendix A.ů. As we have expected, the outcome is the Fried-
man rule which is the optimal policy from a high type’s point of view. This result
provides an interesting link between monetary policy and ﬁscal policy, which is
absent in all othermodels that consider optimal central bank design. It states that
when diﬀerent groups in society have diﬀerent inﬂation goals, the best mone-
tary policy can nevertheless be implemented. It requires, however, that ﬁscal and
monetary policy are jointly determined. That is, the policy board implements the
Friedman rule and at the same time ﬁscal policy is used to compensate the party
that loses from this monetary arrangement.
Ů.Ů Comparison
Let us ﬁnally compare our results to the socially optimal case. We have shown in
proposition ū that the Friedman-Rule,  = , generates the ﬁrst-best allocation
in our economy and is thus the policy that a social planner would choose. How-
ever, we have just seen that many central bank designs do not achieve the social
optimum, especially when low-type buyers are in the majority. Hence, which
central bank design is best at achieving the social optimum?
ūŲ
We can now answer this question. First, note that there is a candidate who
will always achieve the social optimum: bargaining with transfers. This mech-
anism is closely related to a ﬁscal policy scheme by using compensations in or-
der to achieve monetary policy goals. However, it is hard to implement such a
scheme in reality as it involves not only the central bank, but also the govern-
ments, not to mention the asymmetric information problems likely to appear.
Let us thus focus on the other designs discussed.
If there is amajority of inﬂation-averse agents, i.e. high-type agents, the only in-
stitutional arrangement to achieve the social optimumwill be a simple-majority
voting mechanism. Then, high-type buyers would vote (and win) for the Fried-
man Rule. No other central bank design (apart from the one discussed above)
achieves this.
In the case of a minority of inﬂation-averse agents, the Friedman Rule is only
achieved through bargaining with transfers. Moreover, implementing simple-
majority voting would lead to the highest money growth rate possible with any
institutional arrangement, ~. Furthermore, a supermajority voting rule will ei-
ther implement the status quo money growth rate, if it is low, or implement the
highest possible money growth rate possible. This is in stark contrast to the ﬁnd-
ings of Bullard andWaller (ŬŪŪŮ) who show that in an ќљє model supermajority
leads to the social optimum by forcing the young agents (less inﬂation-averse,
like the low-type agents in our model) “to choose a monetary policy based on
lifetime utility, and thus to create a stationary equilibrium at the social optimum”
(p. ūūŬ). Thus, the central bank design to come closest to the social optimum in
ourmodel will be the bargaining casewith bargaining power as large as possible
for the inﬂation-averse agents. In other words, if the policy board gives inﬂation-
averse agents more power to less inﬂation-averse participants, relatively, the
outcome will be the closest to the social optimum possible. This result is related
to the ﬁndings of Fatum (ŬŪŪŰ) – albeit derived in a very diﬀerent framework
– who shows that a “weighted mean mechanism” leads to a heavier weight for
inﬂation-averse agents and thus to a policy of lower inﬂation rates.
ūų
ů Extension
Erosa and Ventura (ŬŪŪŬ) studied the distributional impact of inﬂation in a mon-
etary growth model. They found, that inﬂation has “important distributional ef-
fects since it is eﬀectively a regressive consumption tax”. They show thatwealthy
agents are less aﬀected by the inﬂation tax than poor agents. The reason is that
wealthy agents have access to ﬁnancial markets which allows them to avoid the
inﬂation tax. We can easily accommodate our model to take into account of their
ﬁndings as follows. We can interpret the ﬁrst market as the place where con-
sumption occurs without money. Let us redeﬁne the utility in the ﬁrst market
to be i U(x) for all i 2 fh, lg and assume l > h. The ﬁrst-order conditions are
i U 0(xi ) = 1 with xl > xh. We can choose h and l such that the value of total
consumption in both markets of the low types is strictly higher than the one of
the high types.Moreover, with this arrangements, the fraction of consumption in
market ū to total consumption is strictly higher for high types. With this change,
the model is in accordance with the empirical ﬁndings of Erosa and Ventura
(ŬŪŪŬ) that poor people suﬀer more from the inﬂation tax than rich people.
Ű Conclusion
We consider a micro-founded model of money where monetary policy has re-
distributive eﬀects. In this frameworkwe analyze the outcome of various central
bank designs. We ﬁnd that the only central bank design that consistently yields
the ﬁrst-best allocation isNash bargainingwith transfers. This result provides an
interesting link betweenmonetary policy and ﬁscal policy. It states that when dif-
ferent groups in society have diﬀerent inﬂation goals, the best monetary policy
can nevertheless be implemented. It requires, however, that ﬁscal and monetary
policy are jointly determined. That is, the policy board implements the ﬁrst-best
inﬂation rate and at the same time ﬁscal policy is used to compensate the party
that loses from this new monetary arrangement.
However, this ﬁnding requires some caution. In our analysiswehave complete-
ly abstracted from asymmetric information problems and public choice issues.
Incorporating such considerations into the analysismay change our results. These
ŬŪ
are interesting questions for future research.
Ŭū
A Appendix
A.ū Proof of Lemma ū
Constraint is not binding. If i = 0, from (ů), (ų), and (ūŪ), we have for all
types of buyers
"i u0(q) = 1 ) q = q
The amount of money agents spend is q = m. To examine linearity of V ,
note that from (ų), (ūŪ), and (ūūa) we have
V 0i (m) = 1 8 i 2 fh, lg
Constraint is binding. If i > 0, from (ů), (ų), and (ūŪ), we have
"i u0(q)  1 + i and m = q
Hence, trades are always ineﬃcient. To examine the shape of V , note that
from (ů), (ų), (ūŪ), and (ūūa) we have
@ Vi(m)
@ m
=

"i u0(q)  1+ 1 (ŬŬ)
We see that Vi(m) is concave for allm < m since u(q) is concave by assump-
tion for all buyers’ types i 2 fh, lg.
A.Ŭ Proof of Proposition ū
Constraints are not binding. In this case qh = qh > ql = ql . From (ų), (ūŪ), and
(ūūa) we have
V 0i (m) = 1 8 i 2 fl,hg
These conditions state that if agents take a unit ofmoney into the secondmar-
ket, but do not intend to spend it in this market (because they still have enough
money), then the value of this extra unit of money is the goods it buys in the sub-
sequent ﬁrst market. Substituting these equations into the ﬁrst-order conditions
for the choice of money holdings (Ų)
p1 = p2 ) p1
p1,+1
=
p2
p1,+1
ŬŬ
In a steady state equilibrium, Mp2 =
M 1
p2, 1 , implying
p2
p2, 1 = . Using this fact
together with (ūŪ) yields
 =  (Ŭŭ)
Thus for  = , no agent is cash-constrained and we have a monetary equi-
librium with qh = q
 
"h

> ql = q
 
"l

.
Constraints are binding. In this case qh < qh, ql < ql , and qh > ql. From (ūŬ)
we have already derived the following equilibrium condition:
  

= "i u0(qi)  1 8 i 2 fh, lg (ŬŮ)
Equation (ŬŮ) yields unique values for q. The equilibriummoney holdingsm
and the price level p1 can be derived by solving the following three equations:
qi = mi 8 i 2 fl,hg
nhmh + nlml =
M
p2
Thus, if  > , a unique monetary equilibrium exists.
A.ŭ Proof of Proposition Ŭ
High-type agents. Let us start with the ﬁrst claim of proposition Ŭ. The high-
type buyers prefer the Friedman Rule if, from (ūůa) and (ūŭ),
"h u0(qh)  1
 "h u00(qh)
+ nl (ql   qh) + (  1)nl

1
 "l u00(ql)
  1
 "h u00(qh)

< 0 (Ŭů)
Since the ﬁrst and second term are negative, a suﬃcient condition for this
derivative to be negative is   1 and
"l u00(ql)  "h u00(qh)
As "l  "h, a suﬃcient condition is that u00 ql  u00 qh which is true as
we have assumed u000 (q) > 0. The ѐџџю utility function u (q) = q1 /(1  ), for
example, satisﬁes this requirement. Hence, for     1, the Friedman Rule
is the value maximizing policy for the high-type buyers. To show the same for
 > 1we use the equilibrium condition (ūŬ) and rearrange (Ŭů) to get
(  1)
 "h u00(qh)

1 + nl

"h
"l
u00(qh)
u00(ql)
  1

+
(1  )
 "h u00(qh)
+ nl (ql   qh) < 0
Ŭŭ
because
1  nl + nl "
h
"l
u00(qh)
u00(ql)
> 0
This proves that high-type buyersmaximize their value for each period at the
Friedman Rule,  = .
Low-type buyer. The low-type agents prefer a deviation if theirmarginal value
is positive at the Friedman Rule. From (ūůb) and (ūŭ) if
"l u0(ql)  1
 "l u00(ql)
+ nh (qh   ql) + (   1)nh

1
 "h u00(qh)
  1
 "l u00(ql)

> 0
At the Friedman Rule, from (ūŬ), "l u0
 
ql
  1 = 0. So, the ﬁrst term is zero.
Rearranging the above equation then yields:
nh (qh   ql) + (   1)nh

1
 "h u00(qh)
  1
 "l u00(ql)

> 0
Since the ﬁrst term is positive, a suﬃcient condition for this derivative to be
positive is
"l u00

ql

 "h u00

qh

which is true.
Let us now show that – in the limit – inﬂation has a negative impact on the
low-type buyers. Note that from (ūŬ) we know that
lim
!1 qi = 0 8 i 2 fh, lg
Hence it follows that
lim
!1
"l u0(ql)  1
 "l u00(ql)
+ nh (qh   ql) + (  1)nh

1
 "h u00(qh)
  1
 "l u00(ql)

< 0
Thus, we have shown that the value maximizing  for a low-type buyer is
higher than the Friedman Rule, but lower than inﬁnity. Using the result from
lemma ū the value of  that maximizes the value of the low type is unique.
A.Ů Proof of Corollary ŭ
The ﬁrst-order conditions are

@ Wh()
@ 
[Wl() Wl(¹)] + (1  ) @ Wl()
@ 
[Wh() Wh(¹)] +  = 0 (ŬŰa)
 (   ) = 0 (ŬŰb)
ŬŮ
Using (ūŮ) and (ūů) we get

h
"h u0(qh)  1
i @ qh
@ 
+ nl (ql   qh) + (  1)nl

@ ql
@ 
  @ qh
@ 


n
"l u(ql)  ql + (  1) (qh   ql)nh   "l u(¹ql) + ¹ql   (¹  1) (¹qh   ¹ql)nh
o
+ (1  )
h
"l u0(ql)  1
i @ ql
@ 
+ nh (qh   ql) + (  1)nh

@ qh
@ 
  @ ql
@ 


n
"h u(qh)  qh + (  1) (ql   qh)nl   "h u(¹qh) + ¹qh   (¹  1) (¹ql   ¹qh)nl
o
+  (1  )2 = 0
Simpliying using (ūŭ) yields


"h u0(qh)  1
 "h u00(qh)
+ nl (ql   qh) + (  1)nl

1
 "l u00(ql)
  1
 "h u00(qh)


n
"l u(ql)  ql + (  1) (qh   ql)nh   "l u(¹ql) + ¹ql   (¹  1) (¹qh   ¹ql)nh
o
+ (1  )

"l u0(ql)  1
 "l u00(ql)
+ nh (qh   ql) + (  1)nh

1
 "h u00(qh)
  1
 "l u00(ql)


n
"h u(qh)  qh + (  1) (ql   qh)nl   "h u(¹qh) + ¹qh   (¹  1) (¹ql   ¹qh)nl
o
+  (1  )2 = 0 (Ŭű)
For the proof of the corollary, we need to split up the above condition into
two parts. First, we analyze the case of full bargaining power for the high-type
agent. Second, we examine the case where low-type agents have full bargaining
power.
If high-type agents have all the bargaining power, condition (Ŭű) reduces to
"h u0(qh)  1
 "h u00(qh)
+ nl (ql   qh) + (  1)nl

1
 "l u00(ql)
  1
 "h u00(qh)


n
"l u(ql)  ql + (  1) (qh   ql)nh   "l u(¹ql) + ¹ql   (¹  1) (¹qh   ¹ql)nh
o
+  (1  )2 = 0 (ŬŲ)
If we are away from the Friedman Rule, the Lagrange multiplier becomes zero,
i.e.  = 0. The bargaining solution in this case is the money growth rate that lets
either the ﬁrst or the second term become zero. From proposition Ŭ, we know
that the ﬁrst term of (ŬŲ) is equal to zero only at the Friedman Rule. Hence, the
only solution to our problem is to have the last term equal to zero. First, note that
from proposition Ŭ we know that  > ~ can never be an optimal money growth
Ŭů
rate. Hence, for ¹  ~ only  = ¹ can be a solution to the bargaining problem.
Further, for ¹ > ~, the solution is the money growth rate that gives the same
value to the low-type as ¹.
In the case of full bargaining power for the low-type agents,  = 0, condition
(Ŭű) reduces to
"l u0(ql)  1
 "l u00(ql)
+ nh (qh   ql) + (  1)nh

1
 "h u00(qh)
  1
 "l u00(ql)


n
"h u(qh)  qh + (  1) (ql   qh)nl   "h u(¹qh) + ¹qh   (¹  1) (¹ql   ¹qh)nl
o
+  (1  )2 = 0 (Ŭų)
If we are away from the Friedman Rule, the Lagrange multiplier becomes
zero, i.e.  = 0. Hence, the bargaining solution  will be the money growth rate
that makes either the ﬁrst or the second term zero. We know from proposition Ŭ
that ~ is the unique value maximizing money growth rate for low-type agents.
Hence,  = ~ will always fulﬁll the above condition. Second, seĴing  = ¹
will reduce the diﬀerence in values for high-type buyers to zero and thus also
fulﬁll the condition. Note that seĴing  = ¹ for all ¹ > ~ will minimize (Ŭų),
as marginal eﬀects are negative for both terms. In other words, lowering the
money growth rate would not only increase the value of the low-type agents (the
ﬁrst term), but also increase the diﬀerence between the values for the bargaining
solution and the status quo money growth rate for the high-type agents (second
term). For ¹ < ~, the bargaining solution must be  = ¹, as the other possible
solution,  = ~, would again minimize our problem, and not maximize it. The
reason is that high-type agentswould lose value, whereas low-typeswould gain.
Thus the only Pareto optimal solution is  = ¹.
We have now proved with the use of proposition Ŭ that the solution of a bar-
gaining without transfers between high- and low-type buyers leads to a money
growth rate equal to or in between the supermajority voting outcome.
ŬŰ
A.ů Proof of Corollary Ů
The proof is by contradiction. Assume that we are not at the Friedman rule.
Hence,  = 0, and we get
0
?
=
@ Wh()
@ 
+
@ Wl()
@ 
?
=
(
"l u0
 
ql
  1
 "l u00
 
ql
 + nh qh   ql+ (  1)nh 1
 "h u00
 
qh
   1
 "l u00
 
ql
!)
+
(
"h u0
 
qh
  1
 "h u00
 
qh
 + nl ql   qh+ (  1)nl 1
 "l u00
 
ql
   1
 "h u00
 
qh
!)
where we use our results from the proof of proposition Ŭ.
Note that the two above parentheses can only be zero at the same time, when
ql = qh which is not possible and thus proves corollary Ů which states that the
Friedman Rule is the resulting money growth rate from bargaining with trans-
fers.
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